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HIS year saw interesting developments and applications in the im-
portance of harm in false advertising and trade secret cases, in
what constitutes permissible "preparing to compete," in compel-
ling production of trade secret information, in the importance of "at the
time the agreement is made" in noncompetition covenant cases, the na-
ture of proof required to show federal trademark dilution, and other im-
portant business tort issues.
I. SECTION 43(A) AND FALSE ADVERTISING
A. DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN CLAIMS
Some cases continue from year to year. Such was the case of Decora-
tive Center of Houston v. Direct Response Publications,1 which featured
another reported opinion in this year's Survey. Significantly, the district
court had earlier believed there was an open question as to the elements
for the false designation of origin claim in the Fifth Circuit, but upon
reflection, the court has now concluded that the Fifth Circuit would apply
the elements listed here. 2 In an explanatory footnote, the court stated its
reasoning that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' tests for false designation
of origin claims "are not consistent with the tight requirements imposed
so far by the Fifth Circuit."' 3 The court described the Seventh Circuit's
three-part test (defendant used a false designation of origin or description
in commerce, and the plaintiff believes he or she is likely to be damaged
as a result) as "unworkable," and the Sixth Circuit's two-part test (sub-
stantial economic effect on commerce and likelihood of confusion) as
"appearing incomplete" in light of the Fifth Circuit's approach. 4
* Charles M. Hosch is a partner of Strasburger & Price, LLP, in Dallas, Texas. He
co-teaches Trademarks and Business Torts at SMU Dedman School of Law. The views
expressed in this article are his and not necessarily those of the firm or its clients.
1. Decorative Ctr. Of Houston v. Direct Response Publ'ns, 264 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.
Tex. 2003).
2. Id. at 552.
3. Id. at 552 n.52.
4. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(1) Any person who, owned or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any work, term, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, any false or misleading description of any false or misleading rep-
resentation of fact, which -
(A) Is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with an-
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In this heavily litigated case, the defendant publisher had held a con-
tract to publish a directory of the vendors in the Decorative Center of
Houston (the "Center"). When the Center was sold, the publisher agreed
not to publish "the Decorative Center of Houston 2002 and Decorative
Center of Houston 2003 Directories" and not to "solicit tenants of the
Decorative Center of Houston for advertising for the Decorative Center
of Houston 2002 and Decorative Center of Houston 2003 Directories." '5
Later, however, it did solicit fifty-six of the tenants to advertise in a direc-
tory it would call the "Dallas/Houston Design to the Trade Directory."
Not until later did the publisher inform the vendors that its contract to
publish the building-sponsored Decorative Center of Houston Directory
had been terminated. 6 The Decorative Center alleged that the publisher
had misled the vendors into believing that its new directory was author-
ized by the new owners, just as the "Decorative Center of Houston Direc-
tory" had been authorized for the two years before, and claimed tortious
interference with prospective business relationships, false advertising
under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition.
Applying these elements to the Center's false advertising claims, the
court concluded first that the statements criticizing the Decorative Center
were not actually false, but arguably were misleading. But it ultimately
held that the Center failed to produce evidence sufficient to raise a mate-
rial fact issue on the essential elements of actual consumer reaction show-
ing a substantial number of consumers were actually misled or evidence
that the misrepresentations likely influenced purchasing decisions and
that the Center was injured as a result.7 The court found "absolutely no
direct evidence" that the alleged misrepresentation likely influenced the
vendors, and what evidence it did see appeared to be inadmissible hear-
say. In addition, the Center identified several other individuals whom it
other person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) In commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or an-
other person's goods, services, or commercial activities ... shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). Actions bought under subsection 1125(a)(1)(A) are sometimes re-
ferred to as "false designation of origin" claims, while those brought under subsection
1125(a)(1)(B) are sometimes referred to as "false advertising" claims.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the elements of a false advertis-
ing or false designation of origin claim under § 1125(a)(1) are as follows: (1) the defendant
made a false statement of fact about his product in a commercial advertisement; (2) the
statement actually deceived or had a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audi-
ence; (3) the deception was material, in that it was likely to influence the purchasing deci-
sion; (4) the defendant calls the false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the
plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result. See Logan v. Burgers Ozark County
Cured Hams, Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 462 (5th Cir. 2001) (referring to § 1125(a)(1)(A)); Pizza
Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000) (construing
§ 1125(a)(1)(B)).
5. Decorative Ctr. of Houston, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
6. Id. at 541 n.11.
7. Id. at 553.
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claimed had been confused, yet these were of little weight in establishing
that the publisher's statements had influenced their purchasing decisions.
One client's advertisements were paid for by its manufacturers, and the
others had either purchased the same number of ads as before or none at
all. The center based its other claims on this point on hearsay. The total
number of advertisements sold by the Center did drop, but there were a
number of possible explanations for this-most likely the Center's 85%
rate hike over the price the publisher had charged previously-and the
court concluded that what the Center claimed was circumstantial evi-
dence was instead speculation.8 In a footnote, the court noted the
Center's argument that it could not afford to systematically investigate
why everyone of its tenants and the designer lines they represented made
the advertising decisions they made. "Nevertheless," held the court,
"[the Center] is obligated to produce at least some evidence that the al-
leged confusion likely influenced purchasing decisions."9
B. CAUSATION
Causation was the pivotal issue in the false advertising case of Laughlin
Products, Inc. v. ETS, Inc.10 In this action, the defendant had applied for
a patent on its "Sunless Express" tanning booth and had received a notice
of allowance from the Patent and Trademark Office, but the patent had
not yet actually been issued when the defendant introduced its tanning
booths at a trade show in Las Vegas. The defendant distributed a number
of brochures describing its product as "patented," however, and placed
similar statements on its website. 11 The plaintiff-also in the tanning
booth business-asserted that this premature claim of a patent amounted
to false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.
On motion for summary judgment, the dispositive question was
whether a fact issue existed as to whether the plaintiffs were indeed likely
to be injured as a result of the allegedly false statements.12 Relying on
what it described as a thorough analysis of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas in Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,13 the court refused to conclude as a matter of law
that causation and harm would be presumed. Instead, the plaintiff would
have to demonstrate causation and harm, 14 and under these facts the
court concluded that it failed to do so. The plaintiff did produce a letter
from prospective investors "experiencing doubt and hesitation to move
forward," but the letter showed only that the prospective investors had
learned of the defendant's product and were concerned about it as a
8. Id. at 555.
9. Id. at 535-55 n.62 (emphasis in original).
10. Laughlin Prods., Inc. v. ETS, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
11. Id. at 865-66.
12. Id. at 868.
13. Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharms., Inc. 273 F. Supp. 2d 87 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
14. Laughlin, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
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source of competition, rather than the statements that were at issue. 15
The plaintiff's principal also asserted that numerous attendees at the
trade show expressed confusion and uncertainty about whether the de-
fendant had a patented system and how the plaintiff could have one also.
The court regarded these statements as inconclusive and not supported
by the evidence, and therefore it did not credit any link between lost sales
and the defendant's allegedly false advertising. As a result, the court con-
cluded the plaintiff could not meet its burden of showing harm had or
would likely result, and summary judgment followed.
II. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. PREPARING TO COMPETE
Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe,16 a "departing employee" case, posed
interesting questions of fact and law in an area with surprisingly sparse
direct authority. Abetter was a trucking company. It hauled sand and
gravel for its main client, Vulcan Materials, using a fleet of about thirty
trucks owned by independent contractors. One of Abetter's independent
contractors was Mr. Arizpe, who, together with his brothers, owned seven
of the trucks.
After many years of working for Abetter as an independent owner-
operator hauling Vulcan's sand and gravel, Mr. Arizpe was placed in
charge of Abetter's field operations. Apparently he continued to be an
independent contractor in his capacity as a driver, but also worked as an
at-will employee for Abetter at the same time. There was no mention of
a written agreement to this effect, and no post-termination noncompeti-
tion covenant. As head of field operations, Mr. Arizpe worked closely
with Vulcan, and also with the two dozen or so other independent drivers
who drove for Abetter. 17
When Abetter's owner decided to retire and sell the business, Mr.
Arizpe decided to form his own trucking company. He told the owner
this, and also contacted Vulcan and "asked if Vulcan would be interested
in hiring his trucks." After Vulcan expressed its interest, Arizpe incorpo-
rated his new business, and secured permits and insurance for twenty-five
trucks. When this was done, Arizpe resigned his position with Abetter,
taking his brothers and their trucks with him, and on the very next day,
twelve more drivers resigned and joined his new company. This was two-
thirds of the Abetter fleet-a heavy blow in any event, but apparently
made even more so by the unexpected timing. Apparently Abetter knew
that at least some of the drivers intended to follow Mr. Arizpe, but was
very surprised at how many left and at how quickly. Abetter immediately
sued for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference, among other
15. Id. at 868-869.
16. Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.).




With respect to the fiduciary duty issue, there were two principal ques-
tions: First, were the answers to whether Arizpe owed a fiduciary duty
fatally inconsistent, and second, was the evidence factually and legally
sufficient to support the jury's finding that he did not breach that duty.
The jury found that Arizpe was Abetter's agent so that he owed Abet-
ter a fiduciary duty, but it also found that a relationship of trust and confi-
dence did not exist between them and that Arizpe did not breach his
fiduciary duty to Abetter in the manner of his departure. On appeal,
Abetter urged that the answers to these questions were fatally inconsis-
tent. The court explained that they were not, since the test is not whether
findings are inconsistent or even irreconcilable, but rather whether con-
sidering one finding alone, a judgment should be entered for the plaintiff,
while considering the other finding alone, a judgment should be entered
for the defendant. 19 Here, the two issues were merely alternative ways of
asking whether Arizpe owed a fiduciary duty to Abetter-the first
through a formal relationship based on his capacity as Abetter's agent in
charge of field operations which would arise largely as a matter of law
(raising the question why a jury issue was needed on the point), and the
second through an informal relationship which "may arise from a 'moral,
social, domestic or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence,
generally called a confidential relationship."' 20 If the jury found either
way-and it did find Arizpe was Abetter's agent-then it would still have
to answer whether Arizpe breached that duty.
In determining whether the evidence was legally or factually sufficient
to support the jury's finding that Arizpe did not breach his fiduciary duty,
the real question was what steps an employee/agent who has decided to
leave and form his own company may, must, and may not take in prepar-
ing to compete with his then-current but soon-to-be-former principal and
employer.
Here there is a balance to be struck, between the principal's right to
expect his agent to deal openly with him, to disclose fully information
regarding matters affecting the company's business, and not to compete
unfairly, and the fiduciary/employee's (and society's) legitimate interest
in encouraging competition. Clearly this places considerable tension on
the fiduciary-who-would-compete, and the surprisingly few cases in this
area are necessarily fact-intensive.
Generally this balance is studied in two areas: At what point does
"preparation" to compete blur into actual competition, and how much
disclosure of this is required? A fiduciary may not compete with his prin-
cipal while still a fiduciary, but he certainly may prepare to compete, and
"such preparations do not necessarily constitute a breach of fiduciary
18. Id.
19. Id. at 509.
20. Id. at 508.
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duty. '21 Interestingly, the court cited a Massachusetts case, cited earlier
by the Texas Supreme Court, for the proposition that an "employee has
no general duty to disclose his plans and may secretly join with other
employees in the endeavor without violating any duty to the employer. '22
In fact, the court went on to add that "for the right of employees to agree
among themselves to compete with an employer," which the court char-
acterized as being "under ordinary circumstances, a constitutional
right, ' 23 to be meaningful, it must be exercisable without the necessity of
revealing the plans to the employer. '24 Distinguishing the case of
Kinzbach on the grounds that that employee had failed to disclose the
only relevant information, 25 here the court held that in disclosing to
Abetter that he planned to form his own company taking his own and his
brothers' trucks, Arizpe had actually disclosed more than the minimum
legally required of him.26
Further, the court held that incorporating his new entity, obtaining per-
mits, and obtaining insurance were permissible preparations to compete,
not breaches of Mr. Arizpe's fiduciary duty to Abetter.27 The court did
recall that "the right to prepare to compete notwithstanding, if the nature
of a party's preparation to compete is significant, it may give rise to a
cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty," especially "if a supervisor-
manager acts as a corporate 'pied piper' and lures all his employer's per-
sonnel away, thus destroying the business. '28 If he unfairly solicited busi-
ness from Vulcan and unfairly lured away Abetter's drivers, as Abetter
alleged, these would constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty. The jury
concluded that he did not, however, and the court found ample evidence
to support the jury's conclusion.
Abetter may be most useful for its listing of four prohibitions on an
employee who plans to compete with his former employer. "The em-
ployee may not: (1) appropriate the company's trade secrets; (2) solicit
his employer's customers while still working for the company; (3) solicit
the departure of other employees while still working for his employer; or
(4) carry away confidential information, such as customer lists. '' 29 It is
very significant, however, that in this case, there were no trade secrets or
confidential information (the Court did not distinguish between the two)
for Mr. Arizpe to appropriate. 30 Most departing-employee cases are not
so straightforward in that respect.
21. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 510.
23. Id. (citing Ledel v. Bill Hames Shows, Inc. 637 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1963, no writ)).
24. Id. at 511.
25. Id. (emphasis in original).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 511-12 (emphasis added).






The Abetter case also addressed tortious interference, both as a matter
of law and a matter of fact. Interestingly, Mr. Arizpe was both an at-will
employee of Abetter-and in effect Abetter's agent-and an indepen-
dent, third party contractor. The court observed that ordinarily an agent
cannot be liable for interference with its principal's contracts because it
and the principal are treated as one, but where the defendant is both an
agent and a third party who allegedly induces others to breach their con-
tracts, a plaintiff may prevail, provided it proves the agent acted willfully
and intentionally to serve the agent's own personal interests at the princi-
pal's expense. 3 1
Here the jury concluded that Arizpe did not serve his own personal
interests at the expense of Abetter. Vulcan's manager testified that Mr.
Arizpe just "briefly broached the subject of hauling for Vulcan some
day," and never sought or obtained any commitment from him.32 The
drivers testified that Mr. Arizpe never approached them about leaving
Abetter, rather they approached him, and found he would offer better
working conditions, a more personal relationship, and lower rates.33 The
court concluded that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
support the jury's verdict. (Interestingly, there was no discussion of
whether the drivers' relationships with Abetter-which were presumably
at-will-were subject to claims of interference anyway, or whether any
cause of action would lie in persuading them to leave, which they had a
right to do anyway.)
B. APPLICATIONS
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Miller,34 the court found insufficient
evidence to sustain the claimant's allegations of tortious interference. A
permanent servicing agent complained that an insurance agent had tor-
tiously interfered with its contract with the insurer, allegedly by violating
the rules for client contact by failing to get in touch with the permanent
servicing agent once the insurance agent began converting a policy. In
this case, however, the court held that the insurer did not breach its
agreement with the permanent servicing agent, and where there is no
breach, there is no interference. It also repeated an established principle
that inducing a contractor or obligor to do what it already has a right to
do does not constitute interference.
The Decorative Center of Houston case also addressed a claim of tor-
tious inference with prospective business relationships, namely the per-
spective advertisements the Center hoped its vendors would place.
31. Id. at 509.
32. Id. at 512.
33. Id. at 513.
34. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 114 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
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Applying the 2000 Texas Supreme Court case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Sturges,35 which attempted to bring some level of certainty to this area of
the law by requiring the defendant to commit an independently tortious
or unlawful act in order to prevent the business relationship from occur-
ring, the court held that there was no material issue as to whether the
publisher had committed an independently tortious or unlawful act. The
Center claimed that the publisher soliciting the vendors to "update" their
information constituted a Lanham Act violation, but the court held that it
was not. Further, the court added, there was no issue of material fact
suggesting that the publisher had a conscious desire to prevent the te-
nants from advertising with the Center, or that the publisher knew that its
interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of its
multi-city publications. 36
IV. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. DEFINING A TRADE SECRET
Defining what constitutes a "trade secret" has always been a difficult,
fact-intensive exercise. In one of the most important cases in this Survey,
and in the unusual step of a conditional grant of a mandamus petition, the
Texas Supreme Court addressed this issue in In re Bass. 37
In In re Bass, non-participating royalty interest owners (McGill) had
sued a mineral estate owner (Bass) for breach of an implied duty to de-
velop the land. Bass had hired Exxon to do a geological survey of seismic
activity on the land in the mid-1990s, and the McGills believed this seis-
mic data would show that development would be profitable. Bass, how-
ever, claimed the seismic data disclosed from the survey was Bass's own
trade secret, and refused to produce it. The trial court did not expressly
find that the seismic activity data constituted trade secrets,38 but it did
order Bass to produce the seismic data to the plaintiffs subject to a pro-
tective order. The Court of Appeals denied Bass's request for a writ of
mandamus in a per curium opinion, but the Texas Supreme Court agreed
to consider it.
The supreme court began with In re Continental General Tire, Inc.,39
which held that the first issue was whether the requested production con-
stitutes a trade secret. Once this is shown, the party seeking production
must show a reasonable necessity for its production. If the party seeking
production fails to make such a showing, an order mandating its produc-
tion would be an abuse of discretion. 40 Here, the court held both that
Bass met his burden to show that geological seismic data are trade
35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
36. Decorative Ctr. of Houston v. Direct Response Publ'ns, 264 F. Supp. 2d 535, 556
(S.D. Tex. 2003).
37. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).
38. Id. at 738.
39. In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998).
40. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 738.
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secrets, and that the McGills failed to meet their burden of showing ne-
cessity (since there was no record of a duty to develop or breach of that
duty).
Why and how the court concluded Bass met his burden of showing geo-
logical seismic data are trade secrets is significant, and resolves a split
among the courts of appeal. Texas has long followed the definition of a
trade secret found in the original Restatement of Torts.4 1 "Any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's busi-
ness and presents an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it", and has applied the Restatement's six-
factor test in order to determine whether a trade secret exists:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in the business; (3) the extent of the measures taken by him
to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the informa-
tion to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money
expended by him in developing the information; and (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.42
These factors have been carried forward into the new Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, which treats the factors as relevant,
though not dispositive, criteria. 43
The first issue-on which the courts of appeal appear to have been
split-is whether the six factors should merely be weighed as relevant
criteria, or whether a person claiming a trade secret privilege must satisfy
all six factors before trade secret status applies. In Bass, the court makes
clear that the party claiming a trade secret should not be required to sat-
isfy all six factors of the Restatement of Torts,44 "because trade secrets do
not fit neatly into each factor every time."'45 Nor would the court regard
the six factors as exhaustive: "We additionally recognize that other cir-
cumstances could also be relevant to the trade secret analysis."'4 6 Instead,
all the factors are to be weighed in the context of the surrounding circum-
stances, and others may come to the fore.
Interestingly, in this case the court introduced a new factor-namely,
how the oil and gas industry typically treats seismic data and other meth-
ods for obtaining subsurface geological information-before even pro-
ceeding to consider the traditional six factors. It is "undisputed," in the
court's view, that the industry typically treats such data as trade secrets,
as do other jurisdictions (the court cited Alabama, Indiana and the Fifth
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)
42. Id.
43. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 739 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 39 cmt. d (1995)).
44. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).




Circuit). 47 With this background (or it may be called a "first factor," or
perhaps a "surrounding circumstances" in whose context the other six
factors may be weighed), it was not surprising that the court concluded
the traditional six factors weighed in favor of trade secret status. The
record indicated the seismic data was not readily available, had been kept
closely held, was expensive and valuable, and would be costly to
reproduce.48
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY OF TRADE SECRETS
In the second Texas Supreme Court case addressing trade secret privi-
lege, the court revisited the trade secret status of a tire manufacturer's
formula for "skim stock" in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.49 Plaintiffs
in the "defective tire" cases again sought the skim stock formula. The
trial court found that Firestone had established its trade secret privilege,
and under Continental General Tire, the burden then fell upon the plain-
tiffs to establish that the information was necessary or essential for a fair
adjudication of their claims.5 0 The trial court found the plaintiffs met this
burden, and ordered Firestone to produce the formula under a protective
order.
On application for a writ of mandamus, the court revisited the issue of
what would or would not be considered "necessary" for a fair adjudica-
tion. In Continental General Tire, the court merely said it would depend
on the circumstances involved. Firestone argued that once trade secret
status is shown, discovery should be precluded unless the plaintiff could
not prevail without it. The court refused to read Continental General Tire
that broadly, repeating that the degree to which information is "neces-
sary" would depend on the nature of the information and the context of
the case. It noted that it may be theoretically possible to prevail without
access to trade secret information, and yet it would be unfair to put him
to much weaker proof without the information.5 1 The court did add that
"we can say with certainty that the test cannot be satisfied merely by
general assertions of unfairness.... Just as a party who claims the trade
secret privilege ... must provide detailed information in support of the
claim, so a party seeking such information . . . must demonstrate with
specificity exactly how the lack of the information will impair the presen-
tation of the case on the merits to the point that an unjust result is a real,
rather than a merely possible, threat.15 2
To Justices O'Neill and Schneider, this was not enough guidance. In a
concurring opinion, they characterized the court's approach as "ad
47. Id.
48. Id. at 741-42.
49. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. 2003).
50. Id. at 731 (discussing In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 610-13 (Tex.
1998)).
51. Id. at 732.
52. Id. at 732-33.
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hoc,"' 5 3 and urged that determining what evidence is "necessary" should
be clearer. As guiding principles, they suggested first that trade secret
information be generally discoverable "when not allowing discovery
would significantly impair a party's ability to establish or rebut a material
element of a claim or defense," as when the information is unavailable
from any other source, and no adequate alternative means of proof exists.
Second, they suggested that discovery of trade secret information also be
deemed necessary when the party seeking it could not otherwise knowl-
edgeably cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses, or formulate its
own opinions supported by an adequate foundation.
54
C. VALUE OF A TRADE SECRET
The value of a trade secret was at issue in the final chapter of the long-
running case of Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.55 Here, the court
held that after many years of litigation, the plaintiff had finally been una-
ble to advance a theory and non-speculative supporting evidence from
which a jury could reasonably value the alleged trade secrets and hence
assess damages, and accordingly granted summary judgment for the
defense.
Alcatel alleged that in the late 1990's, a California company called
Monterey Networks had relocated close to Alcatel's office and methodi-
cally hired ten former Alcatel engineers, all of whom possessed highly
confidential technical and marketing information of Alcatel. With these
engineers (and one in particular), Alcatel alleged Monterey then de-
signed and developed a particular product called the "Wavelength
Router," designed specifically to offer to AT&T in competition with Al-
catel. According to Alcatel, Monterey was keenly interested in the valua-
ble AT&T contract not only for the contract's own sake, but also because
gaining that contract would make Monterey an attractive acquisition tar-
get for Cisco Systems, Inc. Indeed, Cisco did invest $19.5 million for a
9.75 percent interest in Monterey in May 1999, and when AT&T selected
Monterey as one of the finalists in the competition for its contract, Cisco
agreed to buy the rest of Monterey's stock for $517 million in a deal that
closed in September 1999.56
The timing is significant because in Alcatel's view, Monterey was only
worth so many hundreds of millions of dollars because it had been able to
pique AT&T's interest with its new "Wavelength Router" product (its
only product, not incidentally); and Monterey had only been able to de-
velop its product as quickly as it did-and in time for all this to matter-
by misappropriating Alcatel's trade secrets (and specifically duplicating
at Monterey what the one particular engineer had done at Alcatel). Un-
fortunately for all but perhaps Monterey's original shareholders, in early
53. Id. at 735.
54. Id. at 736.
55. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
56. Id. at 663-64.
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2000 AT&T decided not to pursue its potential relationship with Cisco for
its "Wavelength Router." In April 2001 Cisco decided to drop the
"Wavelength Router" project altogether,57 but by then this action-to
which it had succeeded as a party-had already been pending for a year
and a half.
Damages soon emerged as a major, even dispositive, issue. It was clear
that the value of the trade secrets was to be measured at the time of the
alleged misappropriation. One means of this might be assessing the de-
fendant's unjust enrichment, and Alcatel urged that logically, the starting
point in determining how much Cisco had been unjustly enriched should
be the $535 million which Cisco had paid to acquire Monterey. Monterey
had no other product but this one, and would not have had this one (at
least in a relevant time frame) but for the alleged misappropriation;
therefore this was the value of the trade secrets at the time of the
misappropriation. 58
In the court's view, however, this was all "simply too speculative. '59
The court concluded that Alcatel's theory-that had Monterey not mis-
appropriated any of the alleged trade secrets, it would not have devel-
oped a prototype in time for the big trade show, and without being shown
at the trade show, AT&T would not have selected Monterey as a finalist,
and if AT&T had not selected it as a finalist, Cisco would never have
bought Monterey-was "contingent upon numerous dubious and tenuous
inferences.... A break or non-occurrence in any of the above chain of
events would eviscerate the foundation of Alcatel's damages, and conse-
quently, Alcatel's damage theory is rendered exceedingly uncertain." 60
The court further criticized the use of Monterey's purchase price as a
foundation for the trade secret valuation on the basis of its timing (the
acquisition in September 1999 came six months after the last act of al-
leged misappropriation, and a year and a half after the first).61 Addition-
ally, it failed to apportion any of the purchase price to Monterey
technology it did not allege Monterey had misappropriated, or to any
other value of Monterey as a company.62 This did "not logically follow,"
in the court's view, and was "not reasonable or reliable evidence from
which a jury [could] properly value the rights that Cisco allegedly
obtained." 63
Neither Monterey nor Cisco had made any direct sales, and Alcatel
had suffered no direct damages. Where the plaintiff is unable to prove
specific injury from a trade secret misappropriation, and the defendant
has gained no actual profits by which to value the worth to the defendant
of what has been misappropriated, the court observed that the Fifth Cir-
57. Id. at 665.
58. Id. at 666.
59. Id. at 668.
60. Id. at 668.
61. Id. at 670.
62. Id. at 670-71.
63. Id. at 671.
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cuit has recognized the "reasonable royalty" method of measuring dam-
ages, citing the seminal case of University Computing Co. v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp.64 Under this method-largely a creation so that "the
absence of lost profits by a plaintiff or gained profits by a defendant does
not, nor should not, insulate a defendant 'from being obliged to pay for
what they wrongfully obtained in the mistaken belief their theft would
benefit them'" 65-the court awards damages based on a reasonable roy-
alty the parties would have hypothetically agreed upon, had they been
negotiating for a license at the time of the alleged misappropriation.
Nevertheless, as the court further noted, a plaintiff must introduce evi-
dence "by which the jury can value the rights the defendant has ob-
tained. ' 66 Here, the court held that Alcatel's evidence was insufficient in
this respect as well, being almost entirely focused on Monterey's sales
price to Cisco. The court distinguished this situation from that in Youngs-
town in that there was no evidence of other licenses granted or contem-
plated by the plaintiff for the same technology, of Alcatel's development
costs for it, or how much would have been sold. These were some of the
factors approved in Youngstown to be considered.67
Finding no sufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's damages the-
ory-after, as it pointedly observed,, it had afforded ample opportunity
for the purpose 6 8-the court concluded there was no further relief availa-
ble, and granted summary judgment.
D. TRADE SECRETS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
In a preliminary injunction setting, the case of Cisco Systems, Inc. v.
Huawei Technologies Co.,69 was an interesting application of familiar
principles for handling trade secret claims. In addition to copyright
claims, Cisco alleged that Huawei had obtained some of Cisco's source
code through improper means, and sought a broad preliminary injunction
against its use, disclosure, or distribution. Huawei denied that it had ob-
tained the source code through improper means in the first place, but also
argued that no injunction was appropriate because the plaintiff had not
sufficiently identified that portion of its source code which it claimed was
entitled to trade secret protection, and that no injunction was necessary
because it would agree not to use code derived from what source code of
Cisco's was understood to be at issue. 70
In a manner somewhat similar to that employed by the Texas Supreme
Court in In Re Bass, the court first noted that both courts and the indus-
try "generally recognized that a company's source code can constitute a
64. Id. at 667 (citing Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1974)).
65. Id. at 672 (citing Youngstown, 504 F.2d at 536).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 672-73 n.10.
68. Id. at 668.
69. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Huawei Techs. Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 551 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
70. Id. at 555.
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trade secret. ' 71 There was sufficient affidavit evidence that the plaintiff
maintained its source code under secrecy and used reasonable methods to
preserve its trade secret status, as well as sufficient proof that the defend-
ants used some of the plaintiff's source code in connection with develop-
ment of one module of its software. 72
"The difficult question," in the court's view, was "whether the defend-
ants had acquired the trade secret by any improper means. '73 Mindful of
the procedural posture of the case, however, the court concluded it was
unnecessary to determine exactly how this had come about. The defend-
ants had agreed not to distribute the portion of their code containing the
disputed code. Weighing the balance of harms, the court concluded the
defendants would face little harm from being enjoined from doing some-
thing they had agreed not to do anyway, while the plaintiff could face a
serious injury if its confidential source code were publicly disclosed. Sig-
nificantly, under the venerable Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway,74
the plaintiff must still show it is likely to win on the merits, but the court
recalled that "[a]lthough a showing that plaintiff will be more severely
prejudiced by a denial of the injunction than defendant would be by its
grant does not remove the need to show some probability of waning on
the merits, it does lower the standard that must be met." 75 Applied here,
the low risk of harm to the defendant coupled with the more serious
threat to the plaintiff lowered the showing the court felt was necessary on
the merits enough to warrant a preliminary injunction.
How broad an injunction was a different matter. The plaintiff sought a
worldwide preliminary injunction that would prevent any disclosure or
transfer of any Cisco source code.76 The preliminary record, however,
did not persuade the court that the similarities between the defendant's
and the plaintiff's codes other than the specific module at issue warranted
such a broad injunction. Mindful that a preliminary injunction is "an ex-
traordinary remedy, not available unless the plaintiff carries his burden of
persuasion as to all of the four prerequisites, ' 77 the court limited the pre-
liminary injunction to the specific module at issue, and required a surety
bond of $5,000,000.78
E. CUSTOMER LISTS
Customer lists are fertile ground for trade secret claims. They may
71. Id. at 555 (emphasis supplied). (Note the distinction between a view that an indus-
try and other jurisdictions generally do regard data as trade secrets, such as the seismic
data in Bass, and the view that the data "can" constitute trade secrets, presumably if the
proper showing is met.)
72. Id. at 556.
73. Id.
74. Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974).
75. Cisco Sys., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (citing Canal Auth., 489 F.2d at 578).
76. Id. at 557 (emphasis in original).




constitute trade secrets, 79 but as the Fifth Circuit reminds, "not all cus-
tomer lists are trade secrets under Texas law.., they must be secret .... A
customer list of readily ascertainable names and addresses will not be
protected as a trade secret."'80 In Provenzale, though former employer
Carpenter had taken steps to protect its customer list, and former reinsur-
ance broker Provenzale had acknowledged it was confidential, it was
readily ascertainable by proper means, and the court concluded it was
therefore not a trade secret.81
F. TEXAS THEFT LIABILITY ACT
The Texas Theft Liability Act 82 provides a civil cause of action for stat-
utory damages, attorneys' fees, and court costs where theft is proven.
The Alcatel case also addressed this Act, both in determining whether
statutory damages may be available even in the absence of satisfactory
proof of actual damages, and also whether a party who has not been able
to show such actual damages may recover attorneys' fees as a "prevailing
party" under the Act. In both respects the Alcatel court concluded it
could not. Reading the plain language of the statute, which makes an
award of $1,000 statutory damages contingent upon an award of actual
damages, the court concluded that Alcatel's inability to recover actual
damages precluded its recovery of statutory damages.83
The attorneys' fees issue was somewhat more complex. The Act pro-
vides that a prevailing party in a suit under that chapter "shall" be
awarded attorneys' fees.84 Alcatel relied on Johns v. Rem-Forwarding,
Inc.,8 5 which awarded attorneys' fees to a plaintiff who had received a
monetary award for conversion, though the jury had not awarded any
damages under the claim directly through the Act. Declining to read
Johns "to its logical extreme," the court observed that the plaintiff in
Johns did obtain an enforceable monetary award that arose from the
same body of facts comprising its civil theft claim, and was vindicated by
the trial court's judgment. In this case, however, there was no material
relief left available to Alcatel under any theory, and the court refused to
hold a trial just to potentially recover nominal damages as a predicate for
an attorneys' fee award.8 6
The case of Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb87 emphasized the impor-
tance of the statutory language "at the time the agreement is made" in
noncompetition covenant analysis. Initially, it presented an interesting
79. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
80. Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 468.
82. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134.001 et seq. (Vernon 1997).
83. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 239 F. Supp.2d 660, 674 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
84. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134.005(a).
85. Johns v. Rem-Forwarding, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, no pet.).
86. Alcatel, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 675-76.




procedural question; it came to the Dallas Court of Appeals as an inter-
locutory appeal from the trial court's denial of the temporary injunction
application. Tom James alleged that the trial court went beyond the lim-
ited probable success/probable harm standard of a temporary injunction
and made a decision on the merits, so the court of appeals should conduct
de novo review (rather than abuse of discretion) and hold the noncompe-
tition enforceable. The court did review legal issues de novo, but did not
agree that the trial court had reached the ultimate issue of enforceability,
and declined to do so itself. Instead the court declined to regard the lan-
guage of the trial court's order denying the application as containing find-
ings and conclusions under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Section 296,
and decided to uphold the trial court's determination "on any legal the-
ory supported by the record." 88
In this case, departing employees were subject to two-year noncompe-
tition covenants and nondisclosure agreements. The employees argued
that the noncompetition covenant lacked consideration, because the al-
legedly "otherwise enforceable agreement" was not "ancillary to or part
of" that agreement "at the moment the agreement is made." 89 Three
times in only two pages, the court emphasized in italics that the point in
time relevant to this determination "is the moment the agreement is
made," once citing an earlier case with emphasis in the original, and twice
providing the emphasis itself.90 Applied to the facts of this case, there
were three allegedly "otherwise enforceable agreements": an agreement
to provide sales aids, an agreement to provide confidential information,
and an agreement to provide specialized training. But the court of ap-
peals determined the trial court could have concluded that none of these
were enforceable or non-illusory "at the time [they were] made," because
Tom James could have avoided its obligation to provide sales aids simply
by terminating the employees, and the agreements recited that the em-
ployees "[had] received" the confidential information and specialized
training, which-being past-would not provide consideration for a fresh
commitment. 91
Whether customer lists and other sales information would be protect-
able was also an issue. Most of the employer's printed forms contained a
confidentiality legend, but there was conflicting testimony as to how
strictly that was honored in practice. There was testimony that the em-
ployer did not treat such materials as confidential in practice, even en-
couraging salespeople to take potential sales recruits along with them on
sales calls, observing customers, prices, and the like. With those facts, the
Court of Appeals determined the trial court could have concluded the
employer had lost all control of that information and had lost its trade
88. Id. at 885 (citing Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978)).
89. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a); Light v. Centel Cellular Co.,
883 S.W.2d 642, 645-47 (Tex. 1994).
90. Tom James of Dallas, 109 S.W.3d at 886-87.




A trial court's decision to grant a temporary injunction enforcing a
noncompetition covenant was reversed in Strickland v. Medtronic, Inc.93
Strickland was a sales representative whose noncompetition covenant
would restrict her from selling competitive products in her old sales terri-
tory (as it existed during her last year of employment) for up to 360 days
following her resignation or termination for cause.94 She asserted that
the covenant not to compete was unenforceable because it was not ancil-
lary to an otherwise enforceable agreement, and was unreasonably broad
in scope.95
The initial issue was whether she was really an at-will employee at all,
since her agreement required Medtronic to give her at least ninety days
notice before terminating her without cause. The court disagreed with
Medtronic's assertion that this provided, in effect, at least a three-month
term of employment, holding that it was clear that she could be termi-
nated anyway at Medtronic's election, and thus the agreement did "not
limit Medtronic's ability to terminate Strickland in any meaningful way,"
as it held would be required in order to alter the presumption of at-will
employment.96 Ordinarily, an at-will employment relationship would not
constitute an "otherwise enforceable agreement" because it is not binding
on either party, 97 and the court disagreed that the employer's promise to
provide confidential information or the employee's agreement not to mis-
use or disclose it would constitute "otherwise enforceable agreements"
either, again because they would not have been enforceable "at the time
the agreement is made."98
Interestingly, however, the court did conclude that Medtronic's prom-
ise to provide ninety days notice of termination if she was to be termi-
nated without cause, and its promise to compensate Strickland if the
noncompete agreement resulted in economic hardship to her, would at
least constitute consideration. But these promises still would not satisfy
the other prong of the Light v. Centel test: "A covenant not to compete is
ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement only when (1) the em-
ployer's consideration in the otherwise enforceable agreement gives rise
to the employer's interest in restraining the employee from competing,
and (2) the covenant is designed to enforce the employee's consideration
in the otherwise enforceable agreement." 99 Here, in essence, the em-
ployer was only obligating itself to pay compensation to the employee
during this period, and that alone would not give rise to an interest to be
protected by a noncompetition covenant.
92. Id. 888-89.
93. Strickland v. Medtronic, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. dism'd).
94. Id. at 837.
95. Id. at 838.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 838-39.
99. Id. at 839 (citing Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994)).
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It is understood that the Covenants Not to Compete Act provides the
criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to compete. In Norlyn Enter-
prises, Inc. v. APDP, Inc.,1°° the court of appeals considered whether the
traditional elements of probable injury (including imminent harm, irrepa-
rable injury, and no adequate remedy at law)' 01 must also be shown.
Noting that Section 15.52 of the Covenants Not to Compete Act, entitled
"Preemption of Other Law," provides that, "the criteria for enforceability
of a covenant not to compete provided by Section 15.50 of the Code and
the procedures and remedies.. . provided by Section 15.51 of this Code
are exclusive and preempt any other criteria for enforceability of a cove-
nant not to compete or procedures and remedies in an action to enforce a
covenant not to compete under common law or otherwise.' 02 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that it is not necessary for a promissee to show
irreparable injury for which it has no adequate legal remedy. The trial
court had denied the plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction be-
cause the plaintiff failed to show an irreparable injury and a lack of an
adequate remedy at law. Since the court concluded these were not neces-
sary, it determined the trial court abused its discretion in misapplying the
law to the established facts of the case, reversed the trial court's order
denying the temporary injunction, and remanded it to the trial court for a
new hearing "in conformance with the Covenants Not to Compete
Act."103
The Beaumont Court of Appeals disagreed. In NMTC Corp. v. Conar-
roe,10 4 Matco Tools sought to restrain a former distributor from selling
tools in his former territory. In denying Matco Tools's application for a
temporary injunction, the trial court applied the common-law prerequi-
sites for temporary injunctions, including a probable right to recover, and
probable, imminent, and irreparable injury with no remedy at law, and
found that Matco already had an adequate remedy at law and no substan-
tial risk of imminent or irreparable harm.10 5
On appeal, Matco argued-just as the First Court of Appeals in Hous-
ton had determined in Norlyn-that the Covenants Not to Compete Act
was entirely preemptive on this issue, and that it would provide the exclu-
sive criteria under which the enforceability must be judged, no matter
what the stage of the proceedings. Not, however, in the context of a tem-
porary injunction proceeding in the view of the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals, since the preemption section of the Act was silent on the subject of
temporary injunctions or other procedures available to a litigant in the
short term, and appeared by its terms to apply only in the context of a
100. Norlyn Enters., Inc. v. APDP, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, no pet.).
101. See T-N-T Motor Sports, 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. dism'd).
102. Norlyn Enters., 95 S.W.3d at 583.
103. Id. at 585.
104. NMTC Corp. v. Conarroe, 99 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no pet.).
105. Id. at 866-67.
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final trial on the merits. Instead, the court observed that temporary in-
junctions precede a final determination on the merits and serve the very
different purpose of merely preserving the status quo in the meantime,
that the Act did not eliminate the distinction between temporary and per-
manent injunctions in this context, and that the principles of equity "must
control the pretrial remedy. 1 0 6
Significantly, in assessing whether the trial court had abused its discre-
tion in denying the application, the court balanced both "the equities of
the parties and the resulting hardships from issuance or denial of the tem-
porary injunction," and concluded based on supporting evidence that it
had not.10 7
In Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale,10 8 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law in a diversity case, appears not to
have focused on the requirement of "at the time the agreement is made"
(or the requirement of a geographic limitation, unless part of the agree-
ment at issue was omitted). There, a reinsurance broker left his old firm
for a new one, where he solicited former clients. His nondisclosure/non-
competition agreement had provided for a one-year nonsolicitation pe-
riod as to anyone he had served with while his former employer. The
district court held the former employer did not show a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits because the covenants were unenforceable, and the
former employer had not fully developed its claim of what constituted
trade secret misappropriation.1 0 9
By the time the matter reached the Fifth Circuit, the one-year period
after Mr. Provenzale's departure had long since expired. The court held
that this did not make the injunction issue moot, however, since the
court's equitable power could extend to craft an injunction extending be-
yond the expiration of the period (and adding that "exercising this equita-
ble power might be particularly appropriate" in this case given the year-
long delay in ruling on a motion for reconsideration).' 10
Substantively, the court noted that nondisclosure agreements are not
governed or impaired by the Covenants Not to Compete Act, and con-
cluded that the district court's assumption that the Act would apply to
nondisclosure agreements "erroneously tainted its conclusion that [mo-
vant] did not have a likelihood of success on the merits of this claim." '
With respect to the noncompetition covenant itself, the court also ob-
served that the former employer's unequivocal commitments to pay Mr.
Provenzale $35,000 to execute the agreement, and more if it terminated
him before a certain time without cause were non-illusory and "otherwise
enforceable."
106. Id. at 867-68.
107. Id. at 869.
108. Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 459 (5th Cir. 2003).
109. Id. at 462-63.
110. Id. at 464.
111. Id. at 465.
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Interestingly, the court insisted that the agreement clearly satisfied the
"ancillary to or part of" requirement, insisting (twice) that the arrange-
ment between Mr. Provenzale and his former employer-that it would
give him confidential information in exchange for his promise not to dis-
close them or compete-is "the precise type of arrangement that the
Texas Supreme Court believes satisfies [the] test.' 1 2 Mr. Provenzale ar-
gued, however, that because his employer's promise to provide trade
secrets was illusory (as based on continued employment), it must fail the
"ancillary to or part of" test. The court "decline[d] to adopt this con-
struction of Light's 'ancillary to or part of' test .... To hold otherwise
would pin the enforceability of non-solicitation agreements on whether
an employer discloses confidential information at the time the employee
signs an employment contract. This is not what Light, or Section 15.50,
intends or requires."' 13
VI. BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
What constitutes "truth" in the context of a mixed claim of libel, slan-
der, business disparagement, tortious interference, and other claims arose
in the case of Gustafson v. City of Austin.114 There, a former CPR in-
structor for the American Heart Association complained of an email
from a City of Austin employee to several of her co-workers, stating that
Mr. Gustafson was "no longer a valid American Heart Association in-
structor, that his instructor status had been 'officially revoked,' and that
he could still teach CPR but no longer hand out American Heart Associ-
ation certificates. '115
The principal issue on appeal was whether this was "substantially true,"
which it would be "if its 'gist' or 'sting' is not substantially worse than the
literal truth [would have been]" in the mind of the average person read-
ing it and in the light of surrounding circumstances.11 6 Here, the court
held that the "gist" of the email was that Mr. Gustafson could no longer
teach AHA-approved courses or deliver the certificates, 117 and that
whether he had been officially revoked or terminated was of "'secondary
importance' because the gist of the email is not substantially worse than
the literal truth. 1 18 Accordingly, the accused statements were held to be
substantially true, and the causes of action based on them could not be
sustained. It was not necessary for the court to reach the distinction be-
tween a cause of action for libel and slander and one for business
disparagement.' 19
112. Id. at 465-66.
113. Id. at 466.
114. Gustafson v. City of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
115. Id. at 655.
116. Id. at 656.
117. Id. at 657 (which was what the court believed students taking CPR courses
wanted).
118. Id.




In San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor,120 the court reiterated that
civil conspiracy is a derivative tort requiring specific intent and a meeting
of the minds. For specific intent to exist, said the court, the parties must
be aware of the harm or wrongful conduct at the beginning of their agree-
ment and intend to cause that harm; and to have had a meeting of the
minds, there must be an agreement among them and each must have a
specific intent to commit the act. In this case, some homeowners had
sought a criminal indictment against their former house contractor for
alleged felonious misapplication of funds. The indictment was dismissed,
but the contractor evidently was furious and brought an action against the
homeowners for a variety of issues related to defamation, malicious pros-
ecution and the like. It had joined the homeowners' lender in the suit,
claiming the lender was jointly and severally liable with the homeowners
through what it characterized as a conspiracy to commit those torts.
In the resulting trial, the jury found that the lender and the homeown-
ers conspired to defame and intentionally inflict emotional distress on the
contractor. The court of appeals reversed on this point, however, con-
cluding that although the lender provided the homeowners with docu-
mentation which the homeowners used in pursuing a criminal complaint
against the contractor, there was no evidence that the lender intended, by
providing this documentation, to cause the contractor emotional distress
or to slander him.1 21
VII. TRADEMARK AND TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,122 is the defining case to date on
the elusive concept of federal trademark "dilution." The federal anti-di-
lution statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), provides that:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
ples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to
an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has be-
come famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark.... (emphasis added).1 23
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act defines dilution as "the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition be-
tween the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception. '124
120. San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor, 115 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. App.-San Antonio,
2003, no pet.).
121. Id. at 88-94.
122. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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In Moseley, Mr. and Mrs. Moseley had opened a retail store in Ken-
tucky selling women's lingerie and adult materials, under the name of
"Victor's Secret." The owner of the famous trademark VICTORIA'S
SECRET objected, claiming that Moseley's use would likely confuse, and
also would dilute the distinctiveness of their mark. The issue before the
U.S. Supreme Court was whether objective proof of actual injury to the
economic value of a famous mark-as opposed to a presumption of harm
arising from a subjective "likelihood of dilution" standard-is
required. 125
Reading the exact language of the definition, which defines dilution as
an actual "lessening of the capacity" of the mark in contrast to the later
reference to a "likelihood of confusion," led the Court to conclude that
actual dilution must be established.' 26
Exactly what that would mean in practice, however, would be some-
what elusive. The Court held that it would not be necessary to prove an
actual loss of sales or profits. But it would be necessary to show more
than the "mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's
mark with a famous mark." Referring to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Divi-
sion of Travel Development, 27 the Court observed that "even though
Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license plate
referring to the 'greatest snow on earth,' it by no means follows that they
will associate 'the greatest show on earth' with skiing or snow sports, or
associate it any less strongly or exclusively with the circus. 128
In this case, the record showed no evidence that the famous Victoria's
Secret mark had suffered any actual dilution. There was evidence of an
army colonel who had made the association between an ad for Victor's
Secret and Victoria's Secret and had been offended by the adult materi-
als, but his opinion of Victoria's Secret was unaffected. Nor did any ex-
pert testimony establish any impact on the strength of the Victoria's
Secret mark. The Court did realize that establishing such an impact may
be difficult and expensive to prove, as Victoria's Secret and others who
had filed amicus curiae briefs had argued, but the Court was unwilling to
dispense with proof requirements of what it viewed as an essential ele-
ment of a statutory violation.' 29
IX. COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
At common law, the term "unfair competition" usually meant specifi-
cally the tort of "passing off" (or "palming off") one's own goods or ser-
vices as those of another. More recently, however, in Texas a claim for
125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
126. Id. at 433.
127. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Greatest Snow on Earth").
128. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
129. Id. at 434.
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unfair competition "is the umbrella for all statutory and non-statutory
causes of action arising out of business conduct which is contrary to hon-
est practice in industry or commercial matters."'130 Something more than
mere ugliness is required, however: "[T]he tort [of unfair competition]
requires that the plaintiff show an illegal act by the defendant which in-
terfered with the plaintiff's ability to conduct its business... although the
illegal act need not necessarily violate criminal law, it must at least be an
independent tort.' 131
Applied to the Decorative Center of Houston132 facts, the "illegal act"
would have been a Lanham Act violation by the publisher, but since the
court concluded that the Center had not established a Lanham Act viola-
tion by the publisher, the unfair competition claim must fail for lack of
underpinning.1 33
A similar result, based on a similar analysis, occurred in Laughlin
Products, Inc. v. ETS, Inc.,134 There, the "illegal act" would again have
been a Lanham Act infringement, but in the absence of any specific ele-
ments or theories that would require a different analysis than the court
followed to conclude that the plaintiff could not make out a Lanham Act
claim, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
130. Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3rd 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2000).
131. Id. at 486.
132. Decorative Ctr. of Houston v. Direct Response Publ'ns, 264 F. Supp. 2d 535, 556-
57 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
133. Id. at 557.
134. Laughlin Prods., Inc. v. ETS, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
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